Abstract Research on the basis of political ideology indicates that psychological variables influence ideological positions. In particular, the role of authoritarianism is of long-standing interest to political scholars. This article looks at how political expertise conditions the ideological implications of the authoritarian predisposition. Although theories of authoritarianism imply that it is a constraint mechanism for the uninformed, research on the role of expertise in the formation of ideology suggests otherwise. In line with this, examination of the 2000 and 2004 American National Election Studies revealed that the relation between the authoritarian predisposition and conservatism was stronger among experts; that relations between the authoritarian predisposition and two components of conservatism-opposition to equality and support for traditionalism-werealsostronger among experts; and that the tendency for the authoritarian predisposition to bemorestronglyrelatedtotraditionalismthanoppositiontoequalitywas stronger among experts as well. These findings suggest that the linkage between authoritarianism and ideology is contingent on oneÕs understanding of politics and indicate the need for a more nuanced understanding of what expertise contributes to democratic citizenship.
openness and on the right by opposition to equality and an orientation toward traditionalism and order (Erikson and Tedin 2003; Jost et al. 2003) . In general, this body of research suggests that the formation of a general political outlook involves a matching process whereby citizens gravitate toward the ideology with contents that best fit their underlying psychological characteristics (McClosky 1958; Jost et al. 2003; Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009) . Below, we focus on one such characteristic, namely, authoritarianism, whose influence on conservatism is a classic topic of research. We propose that expertise profoundly affects the way in which the predisposition to authoritarianism is translated into political conservatism and its core components, traditionalism and opposition to equality.
Authoritarianism and Ideological Affinity
One of the most important psychological antecedents of ideological self-placement is authoritarianism, which reflects oneÕs orientation toward conventional authorities and social conformity more generally (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1996; Stenner 2005; Hetherington and Weiler 2009) . The sizable literature on authoritarianism suggests that a stronger tendency toward conformity or deference toward authorities leads to a greater preference for inequality and traditionalism, and thus to greater conservatism. Interest in the construct began with the publication of The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al. 1950) and the ''F-scale'' measure of authoritarianism, which demonstrated that a general submissiveness to authority and conventional norms-an ''authoritarian personality''-could account for both prejudice and political conservatism. Adorno et al. (1950) explained these findings in psychodynamic terms, suggesting that authoritarianism was rooted in the repression of hostility toward idealized authorities (particularly parents) and its projection onto outgroups.
Despite being questioned on both theoretical and methodological grounds (Brown 1965) , this research was revitalized in the 1980s by Altemeyer (1981 Altemeyer ( , 1996 , whose work on right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) relied on a social learning account and boiled the construct down to three facets: authoritarian submission to ingroup authorities; authoritarian aggression toward outgroups and deviants; and conventionalism. Moreover, the scale developed to assess RWA avoids many of the methodological pitfalls of the original F-scale (Altemeyer 1996) . Consistent with Adorno et al.Õs (1950) original expectations, compared to low RWAs, high RWAs are more ethnocentric, intolerant, and conservative, displaying greater opposition to equality and higher levels of traditionalism (Altemeyer 1988 (Altemeyer , 1996 (Altemeyer , 1998 . Importantly, while RWA predicts both facets of conservatism, it is especially related to traditionalism. In this vein, DuckittÕs (2001) dual-process model suggests that RWA is more closely linked to ''social'' or ''cultural'' forms of conservatism aimed at preserving tradition and order than to forms of conservatism aimed at preserving economic inequality. Duckitt further suggests that this is because authoritarian sentiment in general is more closely associated with beliefs in a dangerous world, as opposed to beliefs in a competitive world, which are more closely associated with opposition to equality (Duckitt and Sibley 2009) .
Despite its strengths, AltemeyerÕs approach has a number of problems. In particular, the RWA scale contains items measuring specific political content that it is meant to predict, such as opinions about minority and dissident groups and what to doabout them. Theseitemsresemblemanyofthe measuresusedinauthoritarianism research to assess dependent variables related to political ideology and prejudice. Thus, the RWA scale fails to distinguish between the predisposition to authoritarianism and its political consequences (Stenner 2005) . Indeed, DuckittÕs (2001) aforementioned model conceptualizes RWA not as a basic psychological predisposition, but as a measure of ideologically infused attitudes about social order.
So, how does one measure a genuine psychological predisposition to authoritarianism? Along these lines, Feldman and Stenner (1997; Feldman 2003 ) theorize that authoritarianism is better conceived as a generalized motive for the maintenance of conformity, order, and uniformity, apart from specific political preferences-a conceptualization we adopt in this article. Rather than using a series of items about political attitudes and behaviors toward outgroups, Stenner (2005) measures the authoritarian predisposition using items about childrearing preferences, a simple indicator of oneÕs orientation toward authority and conformity that has validity across a wide range of social contexts (Martin 1964; Kohn and Schooler 1983) . Preferences for respectful, mannerly, and well-behaved children (as opposed to independent, curious, and considerate children) are considered to reflect an authoritarian predisposition. Using such measures, Stenner found that respondents who place more emphasis on discipline in parenting express more conservative attitudes; these effects of the authoritarian predisposition remained robust even when a two-stage least squares procedure was used to account for potential feedback effects of conservatism. Moreover, other analyses suggest that, like RWA, the authoritarian predisposition is more strongly related to the traditionalism component of conservatism than to opposition to equality; traditionalism thus may better satisfy the motivational goals and values that are chronically salient to authoritarians (Stenner 2005; Barker and Tinnick 2006; Hetherington and Weiler 2009) . In sum, this latest approach to the psychology of authoritarianism has the key benefit of distinguishing a general psychological predisposition to authoritarianism that is prior to politics from the specifically political consequences of authoritarianism. equality and support for traditionalism. Further, across measures, authoritarianism shows a stronger relation with the traditionalism component of conservatism. In the present study, we further explore these relations. However, in contrast to earlier theoriesÕ focus on the direct relation between authoritarianism and political outcomes, the conceptualization of authoritarianism we follow here emphasizes the dynamic processes by which the authoritarian predisposition interacts with key political variables to influence ideology and attitudes. Much of this work focuses on a key question: Under what conditions does the authoritarian predisposition manifest itself politically?
Recent research has provided some answers to this question. For example, Feldman and Stenner (1997; Stenner 2005) argue that threats to social conformity ''activate'' the authoritarian predisposition, pushing authoritarians and nonauthoritarians to opposite extremes. From a different angle, research by Oyamot, Borgida, and Fisher (2006) and Oyamot et al. (forthcoming) shows that authoritarians are more likely than others to bring their political attitudes in line with prevailing social norms. When social norms are unclear, however, authoritarianism does not serve as the primary driver of political attitudes. In the spirit of these findings about moderators of the relation between authoritarianism and conservatism, we suggest that authoritarianism is more strongly related to ideological conservatism among some individuals than among others. Specifically, we propose that authoritarianism is more readily translated into conservatism among those who know more about politics and have a better grasp of abstract political ideas.
In this vein, an extensive literature on the social construction of ideological options highlights the importance of political expertise, or factual knowledge of politics, in the formation of political ideology (Zaller 1992; Converse 2000; Sniderman and Bullock 2004) . First, it notes that ideologies like liberalism and conservatism are not unmediated products of individual-level psychological processes for most citizens. Rather, the beliefs, values, and attitudes that make up particular ideologies are packaged by an ''elite'' minority consisting of prominent members of competing political parties and then acquired secondhand by members of the mass public via political communications (McClosky 1964; McClosky and Zaller 1984) . Second, the literature on ideology notes that learning, comprehension, and use of ideological constructs vary in the mass public as a function of expertise (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Judd and Krosnick 1989; Zaller 1992) . Studies have demonstrated that those high in expertise are better able to adopt issue attitudes that are more constrained, i.e., ideologically consistent with one another or with individualsÕ general political orientation (Converse 1964; Zaller 1992; Kinder 2006; Federico and Schneider 2007) .
These findings raise the question of how expertise might condition the relation between authoritarianism and ideological affinity. Whereas expertise increases general ideological constraint (e.g., Converse 1964) , the belief-systems literature historically has not focused too heavily on whether expertise strengthens the relation between ideology and its psychological, pre-political antecedents. Nevertheless, this literature generally implies that individuals who know more about the abstract political concepts and issue content associated with various ideological positions also should have a better understanding of which ideology best matches their underlying psychological needs (Jost et al. 2009 ). Indeed, there is some recent evidence for expertise effects of this sort with respect to other psychological predictors of ideology, such as the need for cognitive closure (Federico and Goren 2009; Federico, Hunt, and Ergun 2009; Kemmelmeier 2007) .
Interestingly, despite the fact that it is perhaps the most commonly cited psychological foundation of citizensÕ ideological commitments, research has had little to say about whether expertise might condition the political expression of authoritarianism. In an effort to fill this gap, we offer several predictions. To begin, the relation between the authoritarian predisposition and conservatism-and the relation between this predisposition and core conservative preferences like opposition to equality and support for traditionalism-should be stronger among experts. In addition, experts should be better able to detect which core component of conservatism-opposition to equality or traditionalism-best serves their psychological needs. This leads to a final prediction: The relation between the authoritarian predisposition and traditionalism should be stronger than the relation between the authoritarian predisposition and opposition to equality among those high in expertise but not among those low in expertise.
Importantly, these hypotheses are somewhat counterintuitive in light of the popular understanding of authoritarianism, and support for them would have important consequences for our understanding about the circumstances under which authoritarianism is politically consequential. In particular, our hypotheses cut against the general assumption that authoritarianism constrains attitudes primarily among the unsophisticated. Broadly speaking, this assumption is consistent with research suggesting that authoritarians are especially prone to common information-processing biases (e.g., inflexible reliance on heuristics; see Kemmelmeier 2009; see also Christie 1954; Altemeyer 1996; Stenner 2005) . Several other findings point in this direction as well. For example, with expertise comes a greater awareness of the norm of tolerance prevalent in democratic societies, as well as an improved ability to recognize the logical implications of this norm for other political attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors (Lipset 1960; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991) . Similarly, expertise may serve as a buffer against the sensitivity to perceived threat associated with the authoritarian predisposition (Allport 1954; Christie 1954; Stenner 2005) . Specifically, expertsÕ greater knowledge and resulting sense of efficacy may leave them more confident in the face of threats associated with perceived uncertainty or instability. Thus, evidence of a stronger relationship between the authoritarian predisposition and ideology among a subset of relatively sophisticated individuals-i.e., experts-may suggest the need for a more nuanced view of the assumed connection between authoritarianism and sophistication. In turn, this psychological finding may have implications of a much broader political nature. Consistent with the perception that it is a characteristic of the unsophisticated, authoritarianism is thought to reside mainly in parts of the body politic that are apathetic, alienated, and disconnected from mainstream political life (Christie 1954; Lipset 1960; McClosky and Zaller 1984) . However, given that experts are more likely to participate in political life (e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) , findings suggesting that the ideological impact of the authoritarian predisposition is stronger among the well informed would imply that authoritarianism is in a better position to actually influence larger political outcomes.
Despite these significant considerations, almost no extant research speaks to our hypotheses. Altemeyer (1988) does find that elected officials of different political parties are more likely to diverge in RWA compared to presumably less-informed party identifiers from the general public. However, AltemeyerÕs work does not directly measure expertise or conservatism and its component elements of traditionalism and opposition to equality. Moreover, as noted earlier, AltemeyerÕs RWA measure confounds the psychological aspects of authoritarianism with its political consequences, suggesting that the aforementioned results may simply demonstrate the usual constraining effects of expertise vis-à-vis relationships between different political attitudes. Thus, existing work leaves us with many unanswered questions.
Method
The hypotheses were examined using data from the 2000 and 2004 American National Election Studies (NES). Both the 2000 NES (N ¼ 1,807) and the 2004 NES (N ¼ 1,212) interviewed respondents before and after the elections using a nationally representative sample. In 2000, respondents randomly were assigned to be interviewed either face-to-face or via telephone; in 2004, all interviews were conducted face-to-face. In 2000, the pre-election interviews produced a response rate of 64.3 percent in the face-to-face mode and 56.5 percent via telephone. In the post-election panel, 1,555 of the preelection respondents were interviewed again, with a response rate of 86 percent in the face-to-face mode and 85.9 percent via telephone. In 2004, the pre-election interviews produced a response rate of 66.1 percent. In the post-election panel, 1,066 of the pre-election respondents were re-interviewed, with a response rate of 88 percent.
1 Since we needed to use measures from both the pre-and post-election interviews in both survey years, we used only the respondents who completed both waves in the actual analyses (i.e., N ¼ 1,555 in 2000; N ¼ 1,066 in 2004).
STUDY VARIABLES
Brief descriptions of the key study variables are provided below; further details can be found in the appendix. Unless otherwise indicated, all variables were recoded to run from 0 to 1 for ease of interpretation.
1. All response rates are Response Rate 1 (http://www.aapor.org/pdfs/standarddefs_4.pdf).
Political expertise. Expertise was measured using factual-knowledge items, which are typically the most valid indicator of differences in political cognition that should accompany the possession of well-developed political schemas (Fiske, Lau, and Smith 1990; Zaller 1992; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) . In the 2000 NES, eight items were used; in 2004, seven indices were used. Items were scored on a 0 (incorrect) versus 1 (correct) basis, and the items in each dataset were averaged to form scales (a ¼ .88
Authoritarian predisposition. Four forced-choice items asked respondents to indicate which of two qualities should be emphasized in children: an ''authoritarian'' one or a ''non-authoritarian'' one (Stenner 2005) . Authoritarian responses were scored as 1, and non-authoritarian responses were scored as 0. Responses to the items were averaged to form a scale in each dataset, with higher scores indicating a stronger authoritarian predisposition (a ¼ . Political conservatism. This was assessed using a composite index of two measures: (1) self-placement as liberal, moderate, or conservative on the standard NES ideology scale; and (2) Opposition to equality. In each dataset, this variable was assessed using the six items developed by Feldman (1988) . Participants gave responses on a five-point scale, ranging from ''agree strongly'' to ''disagree strongly.'' Responses were recoded so that higher scores indicate a stronger opposition to equality and averaged (a ¼ . Demographic and control variables. In both datasets, several demographics that were expected to correlate with ideology were included: age (in years), income (in thousands of dollars per year), race (0 ¼ non-White, 1 ¼ White), gender (0 ¼ female, 1 ¼ male), and a dummy variable indicating whether the 2. Examination of the 2004 ANES expertise items has revealed problems with the scoring and coding of open-ended questions asking respondents to identify political figures (Krosnick et al. 2008) . As a check, we reran the 2004 analyses using a three-item scale (a ¼ .71) that excluded the four identification items (v045162, v045163, v045164, and v045165) . These analyses produced results identical to those reported below. 3. All regression results were identical when conservatism was operationalized using only the seven-point ideology item. 
Results
Intercorrelations between five primary variables are shown in table 1. Expertise was related to only one other variable, the authoritarian predisposition (with rs between .09 and .07; both ps .05, two-tailed). Consistent with previous work, the three key variables-expertise, authoritarian predisposition, and conservatism-were all positively correlated. Thus, even at a relatively basic level, our data shed doubt on the notion of a simple connection between low sophistication and high authoritarianism.
POLITICAL CONSERVATISM, THE AUTHORITARIAN PREDISPOSITION, AND POLITICAL EXPERTISE
As a first step, we address our primary question: whether the relationship between a ''pre-political'' variable-the authoritarian predisposition-and a ''political'' variable-conservatism-is conditioned by expertise. In each dataset, this was done using a series of ordinary least-squares regression models. Specifically, conservatism was regressed on expertise, authoritarian predisposition, and the product term for the interaction between expertise and authoritarian predisposition. Age, income, race, gender, and college degree were included in each model as controls. Expertise and authoritarian predisposition were mean-centered prior to the analyses (Aiken and West 1991) . Finally, in order to guard against heteroskedasticity, HC3 robust standard errors were used in all models (see Long and Ervin 2000) . All tests reported are two-tailed.
4. All analyses reported below are robust to the inclusion of other controls and to alternate model specifications. First, we reran the analyses with three additional controls: residence in the South (indicated using a dummy variable), general religiosity (measured using items assessing frequency of prayer, frequency of attendance, and subjective importance of religion), and fundamentalism (measured using a dummy variable indicating that the respondent interpreted the Bible literally). When these additional controls are included, the key interactions in tables 2-4 remain significant. Second, since education also strengthens links between attitudes (Sniderman et al. 1991) , we reran all models with an interaction between the college-degree dummy and the authoritarian predisposition. Again, the Expertise Â Authoritarian Predisposition interaction remained significant in all models. These results-and all others reported in the text-also hold when a continuous measure of years of education is substituted for the dichotomous college-degree indicator. Finally, to be sure that relationships between the authoritarian predisposition and the controls were not biasing our estimates for the Expertise Â Authoritarian Predisposition interaction, we ran one more set of supplementary analyses. These analyses added the five interactions between expertise and each of the controls-age, income, race, gender, and education-to the equations shown as model 2 in tables 2-4. In all of the full models in both datasets, the Expertise Â Authoritarian Predisposition interactions remained significant.
The results are shown in table 2. We begin with the results for the 2000 NES, shown on the left side of table 2. Model 1 examined the additive effects of expertise and the authoritarian predisposition while controlling for the demographics previously mentioned. As expected, those with a high authoritarian predisposition (b ¼ .09, p < .001) were more likely to identify as conservative, as were older respondents (p < .01), higher-income respondents (p < .001), Whites (p < .001), and those lower in expertise (p < .01). In turn, model 2 added the multiplicative Expertise Â Authoritarian Predisposition interaction term to the equation. The coefficient for this interaction was positive and highly significant (b ¼ .29, p < .001), suggesting that the relationship between authoritarian predisposition and conservatism was stronger among those with greater political expertise. In order to probe this interaction, conditional effects for the relationship between the authoritarian predisposition and ideological self-placement were computed at expertise levels one standard deviation above and below the variableÕs mean (Aiken and West 1991) . As expected, the authoritarian predisposition was highly related to conservatism when expertise was high (b ¼ .18, SE ¼ .02, p < .001) but not when expertise was low (b ¼ .01, SE ¼ .02, p > .40). This pattern of interaction is graphically depicted in figure 1 .
The results for the 2004 NES, summarized on the right side of table 2, were similar. Model 1 indicated that those with a high authoritarian predisposition (b 2¼ .16, p < .001) were more likely to gravitate toward the right, as were older respondents (p < .01), higher-income respondents (p < .001), Whites (p < .001), and those without a college degree (p < .02). As before, model 2 added the critical interaction between expertise and authoritarian predisposition. This interaction was positive and highly significant (b ¼ .31, p < .001). 
Expertise and Authoritarianism
Again, conditional-effect analyses similar to those conducted in the 2000 NES indicated that authoritarian predisposition was highly related to conservative self-identification when expertise was high (b ¼ .22, SE ¼ .03, p < .001), but not when expertise was low (b ¼ .03, SE ¼ .03, p > .30). This pattern of interaction is depicted in figure 2 . 
THE AUTHORITARIAN PREDISPOSITION, POLITICAL EXPERTISE, AND TWO

COMPONENTS OF CONSERVATISM
If expertise conditions the relation between the authoritarian predisposition and conservatism, then it also should condition the relation between the authoritarian predisposition and the two general beliefs associated with conservatism, namely, opposition to equality and support for traditionalism. We examined this prediction in a second set of OLS regressions using the 2000 and 2004 datasets. In these models, opposition to equality and support for traditionalism were regressed on the same predictors used in the table 2 analyses. Separate pairs of models were estimated for each dependent measure; the estimation procedure was identical to that used for conservatism. All tests reported are two-tailed. For the 2000 NES, the results of these analyses are summarized in table 3. For each dependent variable, model 1 looked at the effects of expertise, authoritarian predisposition, and the demographics. With respect to opposition to equality, the estimates indicated that those with a high authoritarian predisposition (b ¼ .04, p < .05) were more anti-egalitarian, as were older respondents (p < .01), higherincome respondents (p < .01), Whites (p < .001), and males (p < .01). In contrast, those with a college degree (p < .05) and those higher in expertise (p < .05) were less likely to oppose equality. In the case of traditionalism, those with a high level of authoritarian predisposition (b ¼ .14, p < .001) were more traditional, as were older respondents (p < .001), higher-income respondents (p < .01), and Whites (p < .01). In contrast, males (p < .05) and those with college degrees (p < .01) were less traditional. Comparing across the model 1 equations for the two dependent variables, the authoritarian predisposition was more strongly related to support for traditionalism (b ¼ .14) than opposition to equality (b ¼ .04), as expected. Moreover, based on a test from a model run in which the two equations were estimated simultaneously, this difference in predictive power was highly significant, F(1, 1373) ¼ 23.29, p < .001.
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Model 2 added the Expertise Â Authoritarian Predisposition interaction term to the equation for each dependent measure. This interaction was positive and significant with respect to both opposition to equality (b ¼ .19, p < .01) and support for traditionalism (b ¼ .32, p < .001). In turn, conditional-effect analyses again were conducted for each dependent variable. These analyses 5. In both datasets, the difference between the coefficients for the authoritarian predisposition in the opposition to equality and traditionalism equations was tested by estimating the model 1 equations for each dependent variable simultaneously using Stata 11Õs multivariate-regression procedure (mvreg; see StataCorp 2009). Since this procedure also estimates all cross-equation covariances, an F-test comparing the fit of this ''unconstrained'' model to the fit of a ''constrained'' model where the coefficients for the authoritarian predisposition are held equal across the two equations can be performed. A significant F-statistic indicates that allowing the coefficients to assume different values across equations produces a significant improvement in fit, suggesting a difference in magnitude. The results for the 2004 NES are summarized in table 4. For opposition to equality, the model 1 estimates indicated that those with a high authoritarian predisposition (b ¼ .10, p < .001) were more anti-egalitarian, as were older respondents (p < .001), those with higher incomes (p < .01), and Whites (p < .001). In contrast, those with a college degree (p < .01) were significantly less likely to oppose equality. With respect to traditionalism, the model 1 estimates reveal that those with a high authoritarian predisposition (b ¼ .19, p < .001) were more traditional, as were older respondents (p < .001), higher-income respondents (p < .001), and Whites (p < .01). Again, males (p < .05) and those with college degrees (p < .05) were less traditional. As expected, the authoritarian predisposition was again more strongly related to support for traditionalism (b ¼ .19) than opposition to equality (b ¼ .10), a difference in predictive power that was highly significant when the two equations were estimated simultaneously, F(1, 931) ¼ 11.90, p < .001.
Model 2 added the Expertise Â Authoritarian Predisposition interaction term to the equation for each outcome measure. The interactions were positive and significant in the models for opposition to equality (b ¼ .23, p < .001) and support for traditionalism (b ¼ .41, p < .001). Subsequent conditional-effect 6. In both 2000 and 2004, the difference between the conditional effects for the authoritarian predisposition in the two equations was estimated at low and high expertise using a procedure similar to the one employed above. The model 2 equations were run simultaneously, and the impact of constraining the effect of the authoritarian predisposition to equality across the equations was tested. This was done twice: once with the terms for expertise and the Expertise Â Authoritarian Predisposition interaction coded to yield conditional effects of the authoritarian predisposition at low expertise, and once with the same terms coded to yield conditional effects of the authoritarian predisposition at high expertise (Aiken and West 1991) . NOTE.-Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients and HC3 robust standard errors. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; all tests are two-tailed.
analyses revealed that the relationship between the authoritarian predisposition and opposition to equality was positive and significant when expertise was high (b ¼ .16, SE ¼ .03, p < .001) but not when expertise was low (b ¼ .01, SE ¼ .03, p > .50). Similarly, the relationship between the authoritarian predisposition and traditionalism was positive and significant when expertise was high (b ¼ .29, SE ¼ .03, p < .001) but not when expertise was low (b ¼ .02, SE ¼ .03, p > .40). Again, as expected, the tendency for the conditional effect of the authoritarian predisposition to be stronger for traditionalism than for opposition to equality was more pronounced among experts (i.e., b ¼ .29 versus b ¼ .16 for those high in expertise, as opposed to b ¼ .02 versus b ¼ .01 for those high in expertise). Confirming this, cross-equation difference tests based on simultaneous model runs indicated that the effect of the authoritarian predisposition was much stronger in the traditionalism equation than it was in the opposition to equality equation when expertise was high, F(1, 930) ¼ 16.14, p < .001; but not significantly different when expertise was low, F(1, 930) ¼ .16, p > .50.
Discussion
A wealth of research suggests that the predisposition to authoritarianism is associated with conservatism and its component elements of opposition to equality and support for traditionalism. In this study, we set out to address the question of whether the predisposition to authoritarianism relates differently to conservatism and its component elements as a function of individualsÕ political expertise. In our analyses, we examined the hypothesis that the relationship between the authoritarian predisposition and conservatism should be stronger among those high in expertise, since expertise should provide individuals with a better understanding of which political positions ''match'' their underlying psychological needs. Data from the 2000 and 2004 American National Election Studies were highly supportive of these predictions.
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So, what do these findings tell us? Above all, they provide new evidence that the authoritarian predisposition does not automatically express itself in the form of an ideological affinity. Rather, our findings suggest that the authoritarian predisposition does not have strong ideological implications unless individuals also have the expertise needed to understand abstract political concepts and ''choose'' the belief system that best accords with their underlying motives. In this respect, our results echo findings for other psychological variables (Federico and Goren 2009) . Taken together, this body of findings 7. The differential predictive power of the authoritarian predisposition across expertise levels was not due to greater error among those low in expertise. In fact, our authoritarian predisposition measure was more reliable among those low in expertise (i.e., in 2000, a ¼ .79 for those below the median and a ¼ .64 for those above the median; in 2004, a ¼ .76 for those below the median and a ¼ .66 for those above the median).
suggests that the matching process linking psychology to politics appears to be far less precise among those lacking in political understanding. By extension, the organizational consequences of expertise may run deeper than previous research has indicated. While it is clear that expertise strengthens connections between explicitly political attitudes, values, and beliefs, our results go further, suggesting that expertise also strengthens the relationship between ideology and its psychological antecedents. In this regard, our reliance on childrearing items rather than measures like the RWA scale as an index of the authoritarian predisposition was of special value, as it allowed us to avoid including explicitly political content in our measure of the relevant psychological predictor.
The interactive nature of our results also speaks to the current theoretical emphasis on dynamic aspects of authoritarianism, which focuses on constructs that might moderate the political expression of the authoritarian predisposition. As noted earlier, research suggests that perceptions of social threat in the environment (Stenner 2005 ) and the clarity of social norms (Oyamot et al. 2006) may condition the relationship between the authoritarian predisposition and political attitudes.
8 Joining this chorus, our results indicate that the extent to which individuals understand political life regulates the ideological expression of authoritarianism as well. As such, the present study bolsters claims that the predisposition to authoritarianism can be more or less politically potent depending on the social context and on the characteristics of the individual.
Because we were able to examine the relationship between the authoritarian predisposition and the two core components of conservatism, our findings also shed light on the specific way in which the authoritarian predisposition is translated into conservatism. Dual-process theories of ideology (Duckitt and Sibley 2009) and previous research on authoritarianism (Duriez, Van Hiel, and Kossowska 2005; Stenner 2005 ) identify a stronger link between authoritarianism and the traditionalism component of conservatism than between authoritarianism and its opposition to equality component. Our analyses reveal that this difference is not automatic for all citizens, but is also dependent upon knowledge: Experts are better able to identify and select traditionalism as a set of beliefs that satisfies the motivations and values that accompany the 8. We also ran models demonstrating that our findings are robust even when normative threat is considered as a second moderator of the authoritarian predisposition (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005) . We operationalized threat using a three-item measure of generalized distrust in others in 2000 and 2004; this served as a general index of perceived normlessness (a ¼ .76 in 2000; a ¼ .75 in 2004) . When terms for (1) generalized distrust and (2) the Distrust Â Authoritarian Predisposition interaction were added to the equations labeled ''Model 2'' in tables 2-4, all of the Expertise Â Authoritarian Predisposition interactions remained significant. Moreover, in only two of the six regressions-for traditionalism in 2000 and conservatism in 2004-was the Distrust Â Authoritarian Predisposition interaction even marginally significant (p < .10). Both were negative, suggesting that the impact of the authoritarian predisposition was weaker when threat is high (Hetherington and Weiler 2009). authoritarian predisposition. By extension, this finding may have important implications for the specific type of conservative policies that expert authoritarians express. For example, knowledgeable authoritarians may be more likely to support socially conservative policies than economically conservative policies (Duckitt and Sibley 2009) . This possibility deserves future study.
Finally, our findings are particularly notable in light of traditional thinking about the nature of authoritarianism. As noted previously, authoritarianism is typically thought to have more political influence among those not sophisticated enough to have learned tolerant norms or confidently manage threat (Christie 1954 ). As we have seen, the data in this study do not bear this claim out. Despite its reputation as a motive of the ''unsophisticated,'' our data indicate that the authoritarian predisposition is linked most strongly to ideological affinity among individuals who actually understand politics. In this respect, this paradoxical result echoes other recent findings suggesting that two key indices of sophistication-expertise and education-actually strengthen the relationship between racial hostility and attitudes toward a wide range of social policies (Federico and Sidanius 2002a, 2002b; Federico 2004 Federico , 2005 Federico and Holmes 2005) .
Our results also turn the conventional wisdom about authoritarianism and sophistication on its head in another way: Contrary to previous findings (e.g., Altemeyer 1996; Kemmelmeier 2007), the authoritarian predisposition had a slight positive correlation with expertise in our data. We do not have a clear explanation for this result, and we do not wish to make too much of it given its small magnitude. However, we suspect that it may turn on the difference between expertise and the sophistication variables used in previous studies. Specifically, while the variables used in studies suggesting a negative correlation between authoritarianism and sophistication tap more directly into cognitive ability-by measuring education or cognitive biases, for example-expertise simply reflects accumulated political information (Zaller 1992) . Information acquisition, in turn, may not be as negatively reflective of the general cognitive deficits known to be associated with authoritarianism. In fact, authoritarians may also possess characteristics that push them in the direction of greater information gathering, despite other cognitive shortcomings. For example, studies suggest that individuals who experience relatively high levels of anxiety-as authoritarians do (Duckitt 2001; Hetherington and Weiler 2009 )-may be prone to information-gathering (Marcus 2008) .
9 Further exploration of this pattern is needed.
In any case, our findings suggest the need for a more nuanced normative understanding of what expertise contributes to the practice of democratic 9. Interestingly, we found that the college-degree indicator-a more obvious proxy for general ability-was negatively related to the authoritarian predisposition (r ¼ À.20 in 2000, r ¼ À.21 in 2004; p < .001).
citizenship. Ideally, modern citizenship rests on the model of the autonomous citizen who reaches conclusions about policy on the basis of rational, datadriven judgment, as opposed to judgment rooted in presupposition, prejudice, or simplistic metaphors (Marcus 2008) . While many citizens fall short of this ideal, expertise is often regarded as a saving grace that allows at least some portion of the public to engage in political action that is goal-directed and reasonable (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) . With respect to goal-directedness, our research accords with this view: Expertise does allow citizens to form ideological affinities that are more ''reasonable'' in the sense of being consistent with their inclinations, i.e., it allows them to select beliefs that better serve their underlying goals. However, the implications of this increased goal-directedness may not be ''reasonable'' in normative terms. By strengthening the relationship between the authoritarian predisposition and ideology, expertise amplifies the impact of a variable that is often regarded as ''irrational'' due to its association with prejudice (e.g., Stenner 2005) and errors in reasoning and decision-making (e.g., Kemmelmeier 2009 ). Moreover, this pattern may have significance not only at the individual level but also at the social level, since experts are more likely than others to participate heavily in politics (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) . Taken together, the real-world implications of expertise may not be as uniformly positive as many have assumed.
have, every person thinks that some are more important than others. I am going to read you pairs of desirable qualities. For each pair, please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have.'' The pairs were: ''independence or respect for elders,'' ''obedience or self-reliance,'' ''curiosity or good manners,'' and ''being considerate or well-behaved '' (v001586-v001589 in 2000; v045208-v045211 in 2004) .
Political conservatism. In both datasets, two groups of items were used: (1) Opposition to equality. The six items used in each dataset were: ''Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed,'' ''We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country,'' ''One of the big problems in this country is that we donÕt give everyone an equal chance,'' ''This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are,'' ''It is not really that big of a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others,'' and ''If people were treated more equally in this country, we would have many fewer problems' ' (v001521-v001526 in 2000; v045212-v045217 in 2004) .
Traditionalism. The four items used in each dataset were: ''The world is always changing, and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes,'' ''We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards even if they are very different from our own,'' ''This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on family ties,'' ''The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society '' (v001530-v001533 in 2000; v045189-v045192 in 2004) .
General distrust in others/threat. The three items were: ''Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you canÕt be too careful in dealing with people?''; ''Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance or would they try to be fair?''; and ''Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are just looking out for themselves? '' (v001475-v001477 in 2000; v045186-v045188 in 2004) .
Demographic and control variables. These variables included: age (v000908 in 2000; v043250 in 2004), income (v000997 in 2000; v043293x in 2004), race (v001006a in 2000; v043299 in 2004), gender (v001029 in 2000; v043411 in 2004) , highest level of education completed (v000913 in 2000; v043254 in 2004) , residence in a Southern state (v000079 in 2000; v041203 in 2004), religiosity (v000872, v000873, v000874, v000877, and v000879 in 2000; v043220, v043221, v043223, v043224 in 2004), and fundamentalism (v000876 in 2000; v043222 in 2004) .
